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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2007, thousands of additional pieces of space debris were created and
national security implications were on full display when China launched
anti-satellite missiles to destroy a dilapidated weather satellite.1 Many
countries were disturbed by the significant and relatively quick increase in
dangerous space debris.2 However, a more troubling concern was the notion
that the event was designed to show the intent of a strong China to go toe-totoe with a United States government that had articulated its prioritization of
military capabilities in space.3 This singular event fused two significant
international law issues: the threats posed by space debris and the
ramifications of national security efforts in space.
One year later, the European Union (EU) drafted a code of conduct that
“call[ed] on member states to establish ‘policies and procedures to minimize
the possibility of accidents . . . or any form of harmful interference with other
States’ right to the peaceful exploration and use of outer space.’ ”4 While
initially receptive,5 the United States rejected the preliminary EU draft6 after
concerns were raised by Congressional Republicans and military officials7
that the code would be “too restrictive” on its reliance on satellites for
1
Frank Morring, Jr., Worst Ever; Chinese Anti-Satellite Test Boosted Space-Debris
Population by 10% in an Instant, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Feb. 12, 2007, at 20.
2
Carl Hoffman, China’s Space Threat: How Missiles Could Target U.S. Satellites,
POPULAR MECHANICS (Dec. 18, 2009, 3:06 AM), http://www.popularmechanics.com/technolo
gy/military/satellites/4218443; see generally CARL Q. CHRISTOL, Protection of the Space
Environment — Debris and Power Sources, reprinted in THE USE OF AIRSPACE AND OUTER
SPACE FOR ALL MANKIND IN THE 21ST CENTURY 253, 255 (Chia-Jui Cheng ed., 1995) (“The
term ‘space debris’ does not appear in existing international agreements. Over a period of
time, it has been accepted that ‘debris’ is a popular rather than a legal term, that can best be
described rather than defined. [I]t has come to mean something with tangible physical
characteristics, including non-functioning space objects, non-functioning component parts,
fragments of satellites and rockets, engine exhaust particles, paint flakes, and similar items.”).
3
Hoffman, supra note 2, at 3.
4
MICAH ZENKO, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, POLICY INNOVATION MEMORANDUM NO.
10: A CODE OF CONDUCT FOR OUTER SPACE 2 (2011), available at http://www.cfr.org/space/code
-conduct-outer-space/p26556 (quoting Council Annex II (EU) No. 17175/08 of 17 Dec. 2008,
available at http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/08/st17/st17175.en08.pdf [hereinafter
Council Annex]).
5
Michael Listner, U.S. Rejects Current Draft of EU Code of Conduct; Considers Another
Agreement, EXAMINER.COM (Jan. 12, 2012), http://www.examiner.com/article/u-s-rejects-curr
ent-draft-of-eu-code-of-conduct-considers-another-agreement.
6
Id.; Bill Gertz, New Space-Arms Control Initiative Draws Concern, WASH. TIMES (Jan.
16, 2012), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/jan/16/new-space-arms-control-initia
tive-draws-concern/.
7
ZENKO, supra note 4, at 2.
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national security efforts.8 However, the United States later announced that it
would work with the EU and other space-faring countries to create an
international code of conduct (ICOC) that would build upon the preliminary
EU draft.9 Following the release of the latest draft in March of 2014, the
United States reemphasized its commitment to an ICOC approach.10
Negotiations are ongoing between all space-faring countries to address
these issues through an ICOC regarding outer space activity.11 While the
exact outcome of this process is undetermined, two things are certain: any
international accord introducing rules for space activities will place some
sort of restriction on future national defense maneuverability, and the United
States is unlikely to bind itself to an international accord that it perceives to
significantly weaken its national defense capabilities.
Still, questions remain: Do the advantages that come with an ICOC
approach outweigh the inherent limitations placed on U.S. national defense
efforts? Is it in the United States’ best interest to support the non-binding
ICOC approach? This Note argues that an ICOC approach is the best shortterm resolution to the long-term issue of space debris remediation. An ICOC
is better aligned with U.S. principles of space policy, and provides the best
framework for achieving an immediate effect on the threat of space debris
for all mankind, while allowing the United States the flexibility it requires
for national security operations.
Part II of this Note describes the threat space debris poses, and the policy
approaches the United States has taken over the course of the last three
decades. Part II also details the four international treaties that comprise
international space law, and their deficiencies in addressing the issue of
space debris remediation. Finally, Part II describes the strengths and
weaknesses of the five most discussed approaches to a potential resolution,
8
Listner, supra note 5; Marcus Weisgerber, U.S. Wants Changes to EU Space Code of
Conduct, SPACENEWS (Jan. 12, 2012), http://www.spacenews.com/article/civil-space/18667u
s-wants-changes-to-eu-space-code-of-conduct.
9
Press Release, U.S. Department of State, International Code of Conduct for Outer Space
Activities (Jan. 17, 2012), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/181208.
pdf; Listner, supra note 5; Gertz, supra note 6.
10
Frank A. Rose, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Remarks at the Conference on
Disarmament Plenary (June 10, 2014), available at http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/2014/2273
70.htm (“[T]he United States believes that European Union efforts to develop an International
Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities can serve as the best near-term mechanism for
States to implement many of the [United Nations’ Group of Governmental Expert]’s
recommendations.”).
11
Press Release, European Union, EU Launches Negotiations on an International Code of
Conduct for Outer Space Activities (June 6, 2012), available at http://www.consilium.europa.
eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/130649.pdf.
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including a detailed chronology of recent developments involving the ICOC
approach.
In Part III, this Note discusses why an ICOC approach presents the most
plausible resolution for the United States. In doing so, Part III describes how
the ICOC approach is best aligned with the national space priorities of the
United States. Finally, Part III explains how the ICOC approach is the best
approach to produce short-term progress toward a long-term resolution.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Threats Presented by Space Debris
In October 2009, astronauts aboard the International Space Station were
told to prepare for impending doom when officials discovered that a 1/3
inch-wide piece of mechanical debris from the 2007 Chinese anti-satellite
weapons test was headed dangerously close to the station.12 Hurtling through
space at up to 22,000 miles per hour,13 this tiny piece of metal presented a
catastrophic threat to the astronauts.14 Fortunately, no impact occurred and
the astronauts were able to resume their mission.15 However, the incident
brought renewed attention to the persistent threat of extraterrestrial collisions
between space objects and space debris.16 In an attempt to monitor this
threat, experts track more than 22,000 debris items in space,17 representing
“more than 95 percent of all man-made objects in Earth’s orbit.”18

12
Glenn H. Reynolds, Space Junk and the Law of Space Collisions, POPULAR MECHANICS
(Oct. 1, 2009, 12:00 AM), http://www.popularmechanics.com/science/space/4303567; Mark
Carreau, International Space Station Maneuvers to Avoid Chinese Satellite Debris, AVIATION
WEEK: ON SPACE (Jan. 29, 2012, 1:45 AM), http://www.aviationweek.com/Blogs.aspx?plck
BlogId=Blog%3a04ce340e-4b63-4d23-9695-d49ab661f385&plckPostId=Blog%3a04ce340e4b63-4d23-9695-d49ab661f385Post%3ac7759791-6da2-4bbf-b9a8-016b50200289.
13
ZENKO, supra note 4, at 1.
14
Reynolds, supra note 12.
15
Id.
16
ZENKO, supra note 4, at 1; Michael Krepon, Space Diplomacy and an International Code of
Conduct, E-INT’L RELATIONS (June 21, 2012), http://www.e-ir.info/2012/06/21/space-diplo
macy-and-an-international-code-of-conduct/; see also GIJSBERTHA C.M. RIEJNEN, THE
POLLUTION OF OUTER SPACE, IN PARTICULAR OF THE GEOSTATIONARY ORBIT 38 (1989) (“Present
and future space operations are, therefore, threatened by space debris of many sorts.”).
17
ZENKO, supra note 4, at 1.
18
Joseph S. Imburgia, Space Debris and Its Threat to National Security: A Proposal for A
Binding International Agreement to Clean Up the Junk, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 589 (2011).

882

GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 42:877

In addition to the threat of impact posed by each piece of space debris,
there also exists the threat of the “cascade effect.”19 This is the “process by
which space debris will become self-generating and therefore
uncontrollable.”20
Through a chain reaction, colliding space debris
propagates further debris, exacerbating the problem.21 This catastrophic
scenario was the central plot in the 2013 movie Gravity, which portrayed the
complete destruction of an American space shuttle, the suffocation of the
crew onboard, and the forced detachment of a space-walking astronaut left
tumbling into space.22 Although this Academy Award-winning drama was
purely fictional, the threat posed by cascading space debris is very real.
These hazards present a clear threat to national security, especially for the
United States.23 The United States is more dependent than any other country
upon the ability to use space for unobstructed national security purposes.24
In particular, the United States’ reliance on satellites for national security
creates grave concerns about the potential for sabotage caused by the adverse
effects of space debris.25
B. U.S. Response to the Threat of Space Debris
1. The 1980s as a Foundation for Interagency Cooperation
In light of the potentially catastrophic national security ramifications, the
United States government has made the issue of space debris a permanent
part of U.S. space policy.26 As one of the leading space-faring nations, the
United States began in the early 1980s to lead the international community in

19
HOWARD A. BAKER, SPACE DEBRIS: LEGAL AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 13 (1989). The
cascade effect is also referred to as the “Kessler Syndrome,” after NASA scientist Donald
Kessler. Imburgia, supra note 18, at 597 n.53.
20
BAKER, supra note 19.
21
Imburgia, supra note 18, at 597.
22
GRAVITY (Warner Bros. Pictures 2013).
23
Imburgia, supra note 18, at 608.
24
Id. at 592 (quoting Jean-Michel Stoullig, Rumsfeld Commission Warns Against “Space Pearl
Harbor,” SPACE DAILY (Jan. 11, 2001), http://www.spacedaily.com/news/bmdo-01b.html).
25
Id. at 608–11; MICHAEL ZENKO, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, CONTINGENCY PLANNING
MEMORANDUM NO. 21: DANGEROUS SPACE INCIDENTS 4–5 (2014), available at http://i.cfr.org/co
ntent/publications/attachments/CPA_ContingencyMemo_21.pdf (“[Forty-three] percent of all
active satellites are U.S. owned. . . . Moreover, although space debris threatens all international
space assets, the United States depends especially on satellites in the portions of [low earth orbit]
where the greatest debris is found for encrypted communications, reconnaissance over
Afghanistan, missile defense, and other missions critical to national security.”).
26
BAKER, supra note 19, at 111.
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addressing the issue of space debris through comprehensive national policy.27
The result was an integrated national policy that cut across national space
and security programs.28
In 1981, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
proposed a Space Debris Assessment Program Plan that sought to determine
the magnitude of the space debris threat and develop a system to address it.29
This proposal included a ten-year plan and called for the subsequent creation
of international agreements to address the issue.30 Following this proposal,
NASA instituted a policy in 1982 that was specifically aimed at the reduction
of space debris.31
The U.S. government began incorporating space debris policy in its
regulation of the commercial space launch industry in 1984 with the
Commercial Space Launch Act (CSLA).32 In addition to providing the
Department of Transportation (DOT) with authority to regulate private
commercial launches, the CSLA empowered the DOT to compel compliance
of commercial space explorers with space debris policy.33 That same year,
Congress gave the Department of Commerce power, through the Land
Remote Sensing Commercialization Act, to compel the removal of
decommissioned satellites from orbit.34
27
Christopher D. Williams, Space: The Cluttered Frontier, 60 J. AIR L. & COM. 1139, 1166
(1995).
28
See id. at 1166–76 (detailing how a national policy has emerged from the efforts of
various federal government agencies); Irene Atney-Yurdin, Space Debris Legal Research
Guide, 3 PACE Y.B. INT’L L. 167, 171–76 (1991) (detailing federal policy statements
concerning space debris); BAKER, supra note 19, at 111 (“Until US President Ronald Reagan
announced his revised national space policy in February 1988, law and policy on space refuse
varied according to the regime. Since then, a more co-ordinated approach to the space refuse
issue has been developing.”).
29
Atney-Yurdin, supra note 28, at 174 (citing BAKER, supra note 19, at 71).
30
Id. (citing NASA Conference Publication 2360, Orbital Debris 8–9, 16–17, 1985,
available at http://naca.larc.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19850012878&qs=N%3D4294950110%2
B4294961077%2B4294891361); Williams, supra note 27, at 1166 (citing BAKER, supra note
19, at 112).
31
Atney-Yurdin, supra note 28, at 174 (citing Orbital Space Debris: Hearing Before the
Sub-Committee on Space Science and Applications of the Committee on Science, Space, and
Technology of the House of Representatives, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 112 (1988) [hereinafter
Hearing]; Statement of Joseph B. Mahon, Deputy Associate Administrator for Flight Systems,
Office of Space Flight, NASA, at 18).
32
Williams, supra note 27, at 1169–70 (citing 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 2601–2623 (1988 & Supp.
V 1993)). See Atney-Yurdin, supra note 28, at 176 (describing how the CSLA allows the
DOT to regulate private commercial launches).
33
Atney-Yurdin, supra note 28, at 176 (citing 14 C.F.R. §§ 400–415); Williams, supra note
27, at 1170 (citing 14 C.F.R. § 401.1 (1993)).
34
Atney-Yurdin, supra note 28, at 177 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 4242(b)(3)).
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The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) instituted a comprehensive
analysis of the threat debris posed to national security when it commissioned
the United States Air Force Science Advisory Board (SAB) to conduct a
thorough study of the issue in 1986.35 Among the SAB’s recommendations
was a call for the creation of an international commission and the redesign of
military weapon systems to minimize the creation of additional debris.36 The
study stopped short, however, of calling for the elimination of debris
generation that was inconsistent with the interests of U.S. national security.37
Following the SAB’s recommendations, the DOD signed a policy
statement in 1987 that stated: “DOD will seek to minimize the impact of
space debris on its military operations. Design and operations of DOD space
tests, experiments and systems will strive to minimize or reduce
accumulation of space debris consistent with mission requirements.”38 In
doing so, the United States became the first major space-faring nation to
acknowledge the threat presented by space debris upon the use of outer
space.39 This acknowledgement occurred alongside NASA’s development of
radar and computer systems with the ability to track space debris.40
In 1988, President Ronald Reagan issued the “first public statement by
the chief executive officer of a major space power on the subject of space
[debris].”41 He did so by signing the National Space Policy of 1988, an
update to previous versions that stated: “All space sectors will seek to
minimize the creation of space debris. Design and operations of space tests,
experiments and systems will strive to minimize or reduce accumulation of
space debris consistent with mission requirements and cost effectiveness.”42
The National Space Policy went further than the DOD policy, committing to
minimize not only the “impact of space debris” but its “creation” as well.43
35

BAKER, supra note 19, at 115 (citing Special Report of the United States Air Force
Scientific Board Ad Hoc Committee on Current and Potential Technology to Protect Air Force
Space Missions from Current and Future Debris (1987)).
36
Id. at 115–16.
37
Id. at 116.
38
Atney-Yurdin, supra note 28, at 175 (quoting Hearing, supra note 31, at 16; Interagency
Group (Space), Report on Orbital Debris 18 (1989)); Williams, supra note 27, at 1168
(quoting Gunnar Leinberg, Orbital Space Debris, 4 J.L. & TECH. 93, 107 (1989)).
39
BAKER, supra note 19, at 116; Williams, supra note 27, at 1168 (quoting Bruce L.
McDermott, Outer Space: The Latest Polluted Frontier, 36 A.F. L. REV. 143, 145 (1992)).
40
BAKER, supra note 19, at 113.
41
Id. at 120.
42
Id. at 118 (quoting Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, Fact Sheet: National
Space Policy 1 (Jan. 26, 1988) [hereinafter National Space Policy 1988]).
43
Williams, supra note 27, at 1174; see also supra notes 36, 42 and accompanying text
(quoting language from 1987 DOD policy and National Space Policy of 1988).
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As part of the revised National Space Policy, NASA and DOD officials
co-chaired an interagency working group tasked with formulating policy
recommendations for the National Security Council.44 The group’s final
report was submitted in 1989, and called for continued interagency research
on the debris environment and minimization of new space debris caused by
future space missions.45 The work of this interagency group represented a
forward-looking commitment by the U.S. government to sustained
interagency cooperation on the issue of space debris.46
2. U.S. Principles of Space Policy Beyond 2000
The foundation laid by the U.S. government’s policies throughout the
1980s led to a more nuanced national space policy in the first decade of the
2000s.47
This is particularly true with regard to national security
maneuverability.
Congress established a bipartisan commission in 2000, chaired by the
soon-to-be Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, and tasked it with assessing
the national security of space activities.48 The commission released its final
report in 2001.49 Among its recommendations, the commission called for the
creation of an “under-secretary of defense for space, intelligence, and
information.”50 In addition, the commission expressed the intent that “the
President . . . have the option to deploy weapons in space to deter threats to
and, if necessary, defend against attacks on U.S. interests.”51
Under the Obama Administration, the National Space Policy of 2010
reflects the U.S. intent to maintain maneuverability in space for national
security purposes.52 The Policy lists as one of its core principles the notion
44

Williams, supra note 27, at 1174–75; Leinberg, supra note 38, at 106 (citing Hearing,
supra note 31, at 7).
45
Williams, supra note 27, at 1175–76 (citing Robert L. Bridge & Milton L. Smith, Space
Debris: A Role for Lawyers?, Proc. 33d COLLOQUIUM L. OUTER SPACE 266, 266–67 (1990));
BAKER, supra note 19, at 119.
46
BAKER, supra note 19, at 118 (quoting National Space Policy 1988, supra note 42).
47
Joanne I. Gabrynowicz, One Half Century and Counting: The Evolution of U.S. National
Space Law and Three Long-Term Emerging Issues, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 405, 415 (2010).
48
Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and
Organization, Report (2001), http://space.au.af.mil/space_commission/executive_summary.pdf
[hereinafter Commission].
49
Id.
50
Id. at 32; Stoullig, supra note 24.
51
Commission, supra note 48, at 12.
52
Office of Technology & Science Policy, National Space Policy of the United States of
America 3 (2010) [hereinafter National Space Policy of 2010].
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that: “All nations have the right to explore and use space for peaceful
purposes, and for the benefit of all humanity, in accordance with
international law. Consistent with this principle, ‘peaceful purposes’ allows
for space to be used for national and homeland security activities.”53 The
Policy also proclaims:
The United States will employ a variety of measures to help
assure the use of space for all responsible parties, and,
consistent with the inherent right of self-defense, deter others
from interference and attack, defend our space systems and
contribute to the defense of allied space systems, and, if
deterrence fails, defeat efforts to attack them.54
Subsequent to the launch of the National Space Policy of 2010, the DOD
announced in 2011 the creation of a National Space Security Strategy.55 The
DOD’s announcement re-emphasized the notion that “[s]pace is crucial for
military operations and intelligence collection, but it is increasingly
congested with satellites, orbital debris, and radiofrequency interference.”56
The DOD intended to use this strategy to “promote norms of behavior to
bring order to a congested domain[,] [and] develop international partnerships
to operate in coalitions and reinforce military space capabilities.”57 Together
with the National Space Policy of 2010, DOD’s National Space Security
Strategy encompasses current national space policy aimed at addressing
space debris.
C. Governing International Law and its Weaknesses
Four international space law treaties govern the convergence of space
debris and national security issues: (1) the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon
Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water (Limited Test Ban
Treaty);58 (2) the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in
53

Id.
Id.
55
Press Release, U.S. Department of Defense, DOD Announces the National Security
Space Strategy (Feb. 4, 2011), available at http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?rele
aseid=14245.
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
The Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and
under Water, October 10, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, 480 U.N.T.S. 43 [hereinafter Limited Test
Ban Treaty].
54
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the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and other
Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty);59 (3) the Convention on the
International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (Liability
Convention);60 and (4) the Convention on Registration of Objects Launched
into Outer Space (Registration Convention).61 While each of these treaties
contains significant flaws in addressing the threats presented by space debris,
each is important in understanding the historical legal framework
international space law has employed regarding the issue.62
1. The 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty
The Limited Test Ban Treaty, which prohibits nuclear weapons tests in
the atmosphere and outer space, entered into force on October 10, 1963 after
an eight-year process.63 In an attempt to prevent radioactive waste from
spreading around the globe,64 the Limited Test Ban Treaty obligated parties
to prevent nuclear testing within the jurisdictions under their control.65
However, it also provided members with the power to withdraw their support
of the Treaty in favor of national interests.66 In his Address to the Nation on
July 26, 1963, President John F. Kennedy highlighted the non-binding nature
of the Treaty in an attempt to assuage any fears that U.S. hands would be tied
in the event of nuclear testing by other countries:

59
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, opened for signature Jan. 27,
1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty] (entered into force
Oct. 10, 1967).
60
Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, opened for
signature Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter Liability Convention].
61
Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, opened for signature
Jan. 14, 1975, 28 U.S.T. 695, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15 [hereinafter Registration Convention].
62
Imburgia, supra note 18, at 611.
63
Narrative, U.S. Dep’t of State, Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in
Outer Space and Under Water, http://www.state.gov/t/isn/4797.htm (last visited Mar. 23, 2015).
64
Limited Test Ban Treaty, supra note 58, at pmbl (“Seeking to achieve the discontinuance
of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, determined to continue negotiations to
this end, and desiring to put an end to the contamination of man’s environment by radioactive
substances . . . .”).
65
Id. art. I, § 1 (“Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes to prohibit, to prevent, and
not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, at any
place under its jurisdiction or control . . . .”).
66
Id. art. IV (“Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to
withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter
of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country.”).
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Under this limited treaty, on the other hand, the testing of other
nations could never be sufficient to offset the ability of our
strategic forces to deter or survive a nuclear attack and to
penetrate and destroy an aggressor’s homeland.
We have, and under this treaty we will continue to have, the
nuclear strength that we need.67
2. The 1967 Outer Space Treaty
The Outer Space Treaty of 1967 is generally held as “the most important
treaty governing space.”68 As a fundamental principle of policy, the Treaty
declares outer space to be the global commons of all nations, stating:
The exploration and use of outer space, including the moon
and other celestial bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit
and in the interests of all countries, irrespective of their degree
of economic or scientific development, and shall be the
province of all mankind.
Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies,
shall be free for exploration and use by all States without
discrimination of any kind, on a basis of equality and in
accordance with international law, and there shall be free
access to all areas of celestial bodies.69
Further, the Outer Space Treaty seeks to hold nations accountable to the
international community for their activities in outer space,70 in part to avoid
“harmful contamination” of space.71 The Treaty also holds nations
67
President John F. Kennedy, Address to the Nation on the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (July
26, 1963) (transcript available at http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/ZNOo49DpRUa-kM
etjWmSyg.aspx).
68
Imburgia, supra note 18, at 613 (citing Adam G. Quinn, The New Age of Space Law: The
Outer Space Treaty and the Weaponization of Space, 17 MINN. J. INT’L L. 475, 479, 487
(2008)); Joel Stroud, Space Law Provides Insights on How the Existing Liability Framework
Responds to Damages Caused by Artificial Outer Space Objects, 37 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR.
J. 363, 370 (2002).
69
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 59, art. I.
70
Id. art. VI (“States [that are] Parties to the Treaty shall bear international responsibility
for national activities in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, whether
such activities are carried on by governmental agencies or by non-governmental entities, and
for assuring that national activities are carried out in conformity with the provisions set forth
in the present Treaty.”).
71
Id. art. IX.
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“internationally liable for damage” caused by objects they have launched or
caused to be launched into space.72
3. The 1972 Liability Convention
The international treaty that is the most relevant to the issue of space
debris is the Liability Convention of 1972.73 This Treaty expands upon the
liability regime established in the Outer Space Treaty74 by holding: “A
launching State shall be absolutely liable to pay compensation for damage
caused by its space object on the surface of the earth or to aircraft flight.”75
Included in this are “component parts of a space object as well as its launch
vehicle and parts thereof.”76 To trigger liability there must exist fault,77 as
well as damage consisting of “loss of life, personal injury or other
impairment of health; or loss of or damage to property of States or of
persons, natural or juridical, or property of international intergovernmental
organizations.”78
4. The 1975 Registration Convention
The Registration Convention of 1975 sought to further develop the
Liability Convention by aiding nations in identifying the launching party of
space objects that have caused them damage.79 To do so, it required:
When a space object is launched into earth orbit or beyond, the
launching State shall register the space object by means of an
entry in an appropriate registry which it shall maintain. Each
72

Id. art. VII.
Atney-Yurdin, supra note 28, at 182.
74
Imburgia, supra note 18, at 616 (citing Michael W. Taylor, Trashing the Solar System
One Planet at a Time: Earth’s Orbital Debris Problem, 20 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 26
(2007)); see supra note 72 and accompanying text (describing that nations would be held
liable under Article VII of the Outer Space Treaty for damage caused by their space objects).
75
Liability Convention, supra note 60, art. II.
76
Id. art. I(d).
77
Id. art. III; Imburgia, supra note 18, at 617 (“More importantly, even if the terms of the
Liability Convention do encompass space debris, it does nothing to deter debris creation,
because the Liability Convention requires fault before liability can be assessed.”).
78
Liability Convention, supra note 60, art. I(a).
79
Registration Convention, supra note 61, at pmbl. (“Recalling further that the Convention
on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects of 29 March 1972 establishes
international rules and procedures concerning the liability of launching States for damage
caused by their space objects . . . [and] Desiring also to provide for States Parties additional
means and procedures to assist in the identification of space objects . . . .”).
73
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launching State shall inform the Secretary-General of the
United Nations of the establishment of such a registry.80
5. Insufficiencies of Governing International Law
The current regime of treaties comprising international space law contains
two major insufficiencies that present challenges to the effective
management of space debris for national security maneuverability. First,
these treaties neither define nor describe “space debris.”81 Rather, the
treaties discuss regulations that deal with fully functional “space objects.”82
While “space debris” remains a popular term rather than a legal one,83 some
believe that it can be read into the legally defined term “space object.”84
However, this assertion is disputed and the need for international guidance
on how to address “debris” remains.85
Further, the current regime presents jurisdictional obstacles for any
attempt to mitigate the risks caused by space debris.86 While a country will
be held liable for any injury caused by its objects placed in space, under
current international law, it cannot be prevented “from contaminating outer
space.”87 In addition, the current legal regime provides a country with
permanent control and ownership over its objects once placed in space.88
This creates significant challenges to “the removal of space [debris] by any
entity other than the State of registration.”89

80

Id. art. II, § 1.
BAKER, supra note 19, at 61; CARL Q. CHRISTOL, Outer Space Exploitability: International
Law and Developing Nations, 6 SPACE POLICY 146, 146–60 (1991), reprinted in CARL Q.
CRISTOL, SPACE LAW: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 289, 306 (1991); CHRISTOL, supra note 2, at
255; Leinberg, supra note 38, at 101; Imburgia, supra note 18, at 621 (citation omitted).
82
See BAKER, supra note 19, at 63–64, 67 (describing the historical use and scope of “space
object”); CHRISTOL, supra note 2, at 255–56 (describing the definition of “space object” in
Article I(d) of the Liability Convention); CHRISTOL, supra note 81, at 253–54 (describing use
of “space object” in the Rescue and Return Agreement, Liability Convention, and Moon
Agreement); Leinberg, supra note 38, at 101 (describing various uses of “space object” and its
implication on the meaning of “space debris”).
83
CHRISTOL, supra note 2, at 255.
84
Leinberg, supra note 38, at 101.
85
Id.; BAKER, supra note 19, at 63.
86
BAKER, supra note 19, at 67–71.
87
RIEJNEN, supra note 16, at 55.
88
BAKER, supra note 19, at 69 (citations omitted).
89
Id. at 71; see Gerry Oberst, Legal Issues for Space Debris Removal, SATELLITE TODAY
(Apr. 1, 2012), http://www.satellitetoday.com/via/globalreg/38524.html (describing a report
from the Third Int’l Interdisciplinary Space Debris Congress held in Nov. 2011).
81
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D. Attempt at International Resolution
While the United States has moved forward with domestic projects to
protect its assets from the threat of space debris, it continues to recognize the
futility of any actions that are not a part of a larger international strategy.90
Multiple options exist to tackle the issue of space debris management
through international cooperation, including: (1) a binding international
agreement; (2) a voluntary regime of individual national policies; (3) a
United Nations based approach; (4) an international intergovernmental
organization, and (5) an ICOC approach.91
1. A Binding International Agreement
A binding international accord among space-faring countries could
strongly influence the actions of those countries by providing enforceable
regulatory provisions.92 However, this approach is not seen as a practical
solution due to the slow negotiations process of the United Nations.93
Moreover, active opposition within the Legal Subcommittee of the United
Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space further indicates
that an international treaty approach is likely implausible.94

90

Most recently, on June 2, 2014, DOD announced the awarding of a $915 million contract
to Lockheed Martin to build a network of high-frequency radar systems that will comprise a
“space fence.” Christian Davenport, Lockheed Martin Wins Space Fence Contract, WASH.
POST, June 2, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/lockheed-martin-win
s-space-fence-contract/2014/06/02/f302413e-ea97-11e3-93d2-edd4be1f5d9e_story.html.
91
Steven A. Mirmina, Reducing the Proliferation of Orbital Debris: Alternatives to a
Legally Binding Instrument, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 649, 654 (2005); Imburgia, supra note 18, at
591 (describing a binding international agreement approach); CARL Q. CHRISTOL, Alternative
Models for a Future International Space Organization, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 24TH
COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 173–80 (1982), reprinted in SPACE LAW: PAST,
PRESENT, AND FUTURE, supra note 81, at 427–28.
92
Imburgia, supra note 18, at 633–34.
93
Mirmina, supra note 91, at 652; McDermott, supra note 39, at 652 (“Five years of
negotiations were required to produce the Principles Treaty, ten years for the Liability
Convention[,] and nine years for the Outer Space Treaty.” (citing CARL Q. CHRISTOL,
Methodology and the Development of International Space Law, HAKUMUM ANKASA DAN
PERKEMBANGANNYA 19, 19–28 (Univ. of Padjadjaran, 1989), reprinted in SPACE LAW: PAST,
PRESENT, AND FUTURE, supra note 81, at 349–56)).
94
Mirmina, supra note 91, at 652–53 (“The primary basis for the opposition has been that
further work in necessary to understand the technical aspects of space debris.”).
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2. A Voluntary Regime of Individual National Policies
A voluntary adherence regime would call on space-faring countries to
implement domestic policies that aligned with an independent set of
technical guidelines that are scientifically based and drafted by an
international coalition of member states.95 This approach allows for a
maximum amount of national sovereignty, providing individual countries
with the flexibility to implement international guidelines in a domestically
friendly manner.96 However, increased national sovereignty also presents a
significant drawback to this approach, as a country’s failure to comply would
provide the international community with no effective enforcement device
other than public censure.97
3. A United Nations Based Approach
A third approach involves using the framework of the United Nations to
develop technical guidelines by which Member States would agree to
abide.98 These guidelines would be achieved through a drafting and adoption
process by the United Nation’s Committee on the Peaceful Use of Outer
Space (COPUOS) and its subcommittees, particularly the Scientific and
Technical Subcommittee (STSC).99 This process could potentially involve
the adoption of existing guidelines regarding space debris minimization, such
as those recommended by the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination
Committee in 2002.100
The advantages of this approach include the fact that all major spacefaring nations are members of the STSC.101 Therefore, each would have
some control over the guideline-generating process, as the STSC reaches its
decisions based upon member consensus.102 However, a significant pitfall to
this approach is the makeup of the United Nations.103 Since its membership
consists of only countries, individual governments would be the only entities
95

Id. at 656.
Id.
97
Id. at 657.
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
Id. at 653–54 (“The IADC is an international forum in which more than one hundred
experts from eleven space-faring nations meet regularly to exchange information on orbital
debris research and to identify debris mitigation options.” (citation omitted)).
101
Id. at 658.
102
Id.
103
Id.
96
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allowed control over the ratification of proposed recommendations.104
Private actors and individual space agencies would be precluded from direct
participation in the drafting process.105 In addition, an attempt to produce
guidelines that can muster enough support to pass the STSC’s consensus
threshold presents the threat of a prolonged effort that might produce only
watered-down and ineffective guidelines.106
4. An International Intergovernmental Organization
In contrast, some have called for the development of a new international
organization made up of individual member states, provided with the general
and wide-ranging power to enforce the international legal regime of space
law.107 This international organization would possess a “legal personality,”
allowing it to “act as a formal instrumentality of government.”108 Specific
functions of the organization could include independent investigations of
space debris and the implementation of a space debris tariff on space-faring
nations.109
However, this approach presents numerous concerns.110 A primary
obstacle to overcome is a demonstration of need for an additional
international group, and what its role would be alongside other international
organizations such as the United Nations.111 Other primary considerations
include determining structural characteristics of the group, such as the
method for decision-making,112 determination of the organization’s
jurisdiction,113 and whether private actors would be granted access.114

104

Id.
Id.
106
Id.
107
CHRISTOL, supra note 91, at 428–29.
108
Id. at 429.
109
REIJNEN, supra note 16, at 65–66.
110
CHRISTOL, supra note 91, at 440–41 (listing fifteen issues that must be addressed at the
creation of any new international intergovernmental organization).
111
Id. at 438–39.
112
Id. at 433–36.
113
Id. at 437–38 (describing the need for the organization to have a judicial arm).
114
Id. at 441.
105
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5. An International Code of Conduct
a. Overview of ICOC Approach
International experts working through the United Nations have suggested
that an ICOC might be the best short-term solution.115 This approach
presents several advantages, the most significant of which is speed.116
Because this approach would involve drafting an agreement between private
entities that opt-in to adherence, it bypasses the lengthy delay inherent in
reaching agreement among a group of potentially reluctant national
governments, such as that which would be required in a voluntary adherence
regime or United Nations approach.117 In addition, because this approach
would take place outside the confines of an intergovernmental organization,
it allows for participation of private operators in the negotiation process,
encompassing a wider scope of parties to be bound by the agreement.118
Further, this approach has been used successfully in the past.119 In 1972,
the United States and the former Soviet Union entered into an ICOC to
prevent threatening movements between warships and submarines.120
Similarly, President George H.W. Bush utilized an ICOC in 1989 to establish
normed operating procedures for the military forces of the United States and
the former Soviet Union that were in close proximity to each other.121 In
addition, during his presidency, George W. Bush entered into agreements
regarding arms proliferation using two ICOCs.122
Moreover, there exists a successful track record for using the ICOC
approach with respect to recent space activities. In 2005, partner states
reached an agreement regarding procedures for the International Space
Station crew utilizing an ICOC approach.123 In addition, in 2007, a private
entity created an ICOC among representative organizations from five space115

Mirmina, supra note 91, at 659.
Id. at 659–60.
117
Id. at 659.
118
Id. at 660.
119
Id.
120
Krepon, supra note 16; Agreement Between the Government of The United States of
America and the Government of The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of
Incidents On and Over the High Seas, U.S.-U.S.S.R., May 25, 1972, 23 U.S.T. 1168,
available at http://www.state.gov/t/isn/4791.htm.
121
Krepon, supra note 16; Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities Agreement, U.S.U.S.S.R., June 12, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 877, available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/20693340.
122
Krepon, supra note 16.
123
Mirmina, supra note 91, at 660 (citing Code of Conduct for the International Space
Station Crew, 14 C.F.R. § 1214.403 (2005)).
116
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faring countries to address the prevention of collisions and risky operations
in space.124 This group highlighted its approach as an initial step toward a
more formal international treaty, saying: “[t]he choice between a code of
conduct and an international convention is not mutually exclusive. To the
contrary, executive agreements establishing a code of conduct to prevent
dangerous military practices in space could facilitate the eventual negotiation
of a multilateral treaty that is more ambitious in scope.”125
This approach does, however, present drawbacks.126 First, because
adoption of an ICOC takes place outside the auspices of an
intergovernmental organization, domestic adoption by individual national
governments is not guaranteed.127 Second, multiple ICOCs may present
competing recommendations.128 However, since the purpose of an ICOC is
to produce a measure to encourage immediate action rather than an ultimate
resolution, competing ICOCs will not necessarily mitigate the efficacy of one
another.129
b. Recent Developments: Battle of the Codes
A draft ICOC was promulgated by the EU in 2008 to address the
international issue of space debris.130 The EU draft was designed by
“[t]aking into account that space debris could constitute a threat to outer
space activities and potentially limit the effective deployment and
exploitation of associated space capabilities.”131 The EU draft was later
amended and a new draft was proposed in December 2010.132
While initial signs indicated U.S. support for the EU draft, Ellen
Tauscher, the U.S. Undersecretary for Arms Control and International
Security, announced on January 12, 2012 that the United States would not be

124

Model Code of Conduct for Space-Faring Nations (Oct. 2007), available at http://www.
stimson.org/books-reports/model-code-of-conduct-for-space-faring-nations/.
125
Key Element: Supporting a Code of Conduct for Responsible Space-Faring Nations, Key
Elements of Space Assurance, HENRY L. STIMSON CENTER, http://www.stimson.org/researchpages/key-elements-of-space-assurance-/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2013).
126
Mirmina, supra note 91, at 660–61.
127
Id. at 660.
128
Id.
129
Id. at 660–61.
130
Council Annex, supra note 4.
131
Id. at pmbl.
132
Michael Listner, EU Council Supports an International Code of Conduct, SPACE SAFETY
MAGAZINE (May 31, 2012, 3:53 PM), http://www.spacesafetymagazine.com/2012/05/31/eucouncil-adopts-international-code-conduct/.
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supporting the current draft of the EU ICOC.133 In her announcement,
Undersecretary Tauscher cited concerns that the EU ICOC would be “too
restrictive” on U.S. national security policy,134 a concern echoed by
Congressional Republicans and military officials.135 In particular, U.S.
Senator Jeff Sessions highlighted this concern during a Congressional
hearing on military space programs, saying, “We’ve advanced further
technologically and in development and actually [sic] deployment of systems
than anyone else, and agreements, codes of conduct, tend to . . . constrain our
military. And our military is fundamentally configured so it depends on
space capability.”136 Five days after rejecting the EU draft, the United States
announced that it would seek to negotiate its own ICOC with the broader
international community.137
Congressional opposition was reemphasized the following day when four
Congressional Republicans issued a letter to President Obama expressing
their concerns over the Administration’s announcement regarding support of
an ICOC.138 Among these were a fear that an ICOC would thwart U.S.
national security efforts and the concern that an ICOC would prove toothless
against “irresponsible” countries such as the People’s Republic of China.139
In addition, the Congressmen also expressed concern over a perception that
President Obama might bypass Congress in seeking an agreement on an
ICOC.140
This public disapproval of the Administration’s announcement was
further enhanced by two subsequent events. John R. Bolton and John C.
Yoo, key Republicans and former senior officials under President George W.
Bush, co-authored an op-ed in the March 8, 2012 New York Times that was
strongly critical of the Obama Administration and the EU ICOC in
133

Listner, supra note 5; Gertz, supra note 6.
Listner, supra note 5; Gertz, supra note 6.
135
Listner, supra note 5; Weisgerber, supra note 8; ZENKO, supra note 4.
136
Hearing to Receive Testimony on Military Space Programs in Review of the Defense
Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2012 and the Future Years Defense Program Before the
Subcomm. on Strategic Forces of the S. Comm. on Armed Forces, 112 Cong. 14 (2011)
(statement of Sen. Jeff Sessions, Ranking Member, Subcomm. on Strategic Forces of the S.
Comm. on Armed Forces) [hereinafter Defense Hearing].
137
Press Release, supra note 9.
138
Michael Listner, Congress Draws a Legal Line in the Sand Over the Code of Conduct,
EXAMINER.COM (Feb. 9, 2012), http://www.examiner.com/article/congress-draws-a-legal-linethe-sand-over-the-code-of-conduct.
139
Id.; Press Release, Congressman Michael Turner, Turner Statement on the Administration’s
Intention to Sign onto EU Code of Conduct for Space (Jan. 17, 2012), available at http://turner.
house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=275084.
140
Listner, supra note 138.
134
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general.141 In criticizing an ICOC approach, the authors asserted, “American
security must not be sacrificed for the false promises of global
governance.”142 A few weeks later, Congress debated the 2013 DOD
funding bill that included a specific prohibition against “implement[ing] or
comply[ing] with an international agreement concerning outer space
activities unless such agreement is ratified by the Senate or authorized by
statute.”143 While the outcome of these public dissents is not immediately
relevant, it is clear that Republicans in Congress remain cautious of
supporting an ICOC approach, but are intent on using whatever means they
can to ensure a role in any ICOC adoption process.144
Just as the United States endorsed starting an ICOC drafting process
anew, the EU provided further support behind its own draft ICOC.145 On
May 29, 2012, the EU Council formally supported its ICOC proposal,146 and
it appeared that a “battle of the codes” was quickly developing.147 However,
the EU convened two rounds of Open-ended Consultations in Kiev in May
2013 and Bangkok in November 2013, allowing 140 participants from sixtyone different countries to offer comments and suggestions.148 A third
Consultation round was held in May 2014 in Luxembourg.149 Following
each Consultation round, a new draft ICOC has been issued that incorporates
international feedback.150 While domestic and international observers
continue to point out weaknesses in the ICOC drafts,151 the United States
141
John R. Bolton & John C. Yoo, Op-Ed, Hands Off the Heavens, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8,
2012, at A31.
142
Id.
143
Amendment to H.R. 4310, 112th Cong. (2012), available at http://armedservices.house.
gov/index.cfm/files/serve?File_id=6fdb326e-9d6d-444d-a330-891ae7341a55.
144
Michael Listner, Separation of Powers Battle Over a Space Code of Conduct Heats Up,
SPACE REV. (May 21, 2012), http://www.thespacereview.com/article/2215/1.
145
Michael Listner, EU Takes the Next Shot in the Battle of the Codes, SPACE REV. (June 4,
2012), http://www.thespacereview.com/article/2092/1.
146
Council Decision 2012/281/CFSP, 2012 O.J. (L 140) 68; Listner, supra note 145.
147
Listner, supra note 145.
148
Outer Space Activities, EUROPEAN EXTERNAL ACTION SERVICE, http://eeas.europa.eu/non-pr
oliferation-and-disarmament/outer-space-activities/index_en.htm (last visited June 16, 2014).
149
Id.
150
Id.
151
See, e.g., Michael Listner, U.S. Should Take a Cold, Hard Look at Space Code of
Conduct, SPACENEWS, Apr. 7, 2014, http://www.spacenews.com/article/opinion/40128us-sho
uld-take-a-cold-hard-look-at-space-code-of-conduct (citing the potential for greater burdens
and restrictions on the United States without tangible benefits); Michael Listner, Customary
International Law: A Troublesome Question for the Code of Conduct?, SPACE REV., Apr. 28,
2014, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/2500/1 (citing the potential for unintentional
consequences that would legally bind the United States long-term). See also OBSERVER
RESEARCH FOUNDATION, AWAITING LAUNCH: PERSPECTIVES ON THE DRAFT ICOC FOR OUTER
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reemphasized its commitment to an ICOC approach in June 2014, and
advocated the EU draft as the best conduit for international agreement before
year’s end.152 While it appears the EU has a strategy to win over countries
that originally opposed the preliminary EU draft, the toughest challenge for
the United States remains “the issue of dissent among members of Congress
about whether a code of [conduct] should be implemented.”153
III. ANALYSIS
While the EU and United States each work diplomatic channels to
advocate for their own best interests in an ICOC, one thing is certain: both
have identified an ICOC approach as the best manner to address the issue of
space debris remediation. However, if the United States is ultimately to
succeed in utilizing an ICOC approach, President Obama’s Administration
will first have to impress upon Congressional opponents that an ICOC
approach is in the best interest of U.S. national security policy. This
argument can most effectively be made by asserting two chief advantages to
the ICOC approach: (1) it most closely aligns with U.S. national space
priorities; and (2) it is the most efficacious approach in the short term that
will lead to a long-term resolution.
A. Aligned with National Space Priorities
Two clear U.S. priorities can be determined from the general principles of
the current national space policy: the United States is intent on reserving the
right to use space for national security measures,154 and it views itself, as
“the leading space-faring nation,”155 a protector of space as a global
commons.156 Any approach taken toward international agreement that seeks
the support of the United States in the remediation of space debris will have
to allow for both of these priorities.157 Most notably, any approach that does
SPACE ACTIVITIES 19–92 (Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan & Daniel A. Porras eds., 2014),
available at http://orfonline.org/cms/export/orfonline/modules/report/attachments/awaiting_1
398688856053.pdf.
152
Rose, supra note 10 (“The United States fully support[s] the EU’s ambition of finalizing
the Code this year, or soon thereafter.”).
153
Listner, supra note 145.
154
National Space Policy of 2010, supra note 52, at 3 (describing the third and fifth
principles).
155
Id. at 2.
156
Id. (describing the first, fourth, and fifth principles).
157
Id. at 3 (“In this spirit of cooperation, the United States will adhere to, and proposes that
other nations recognize and adhere to, the following principles . . . .”).
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not allow for the priority of national security maneuverability will face
certain opposition from the White House, Congress, and the U.S. Military.158
An ICOC approach allows the United States to best uphold these
priorities. First, an ICOC allows the United States to maximize its national
security maneuverability by providing flexibility.159 An ICOC, including the
draft ICOC prepared by the EU, would place a constraint on U.S. behaviors,
not its capabilities.160 In other words, the United States would be permitted
under an ICOC approach to develop whatever space system it deemed
necessary for its national security or for any other reason.161
Indeed, an ICOC approach does a better job of this than other potential
approaches to international agreement. A binding agreement would place
too much constraint on the United States, forcing it to concede some of its
national freedoms in exchange for international agreement.162 A binding
agreement would also provide the United States with the least amount of
flexibility to respond to perceived national security threats.163 Unlike a
binding agreement, an ICOC provides countries with flexibility to address
highly technical areas of space law, such as space debris remediation.164
Likewise, a voluntary regime of national policies is not an effective
option. While this approach would allow the United States the greatest
leeway in establishing its own guidelines, it would also provide this freedom

158

See id. (listing the use of space for national and homeland security activities as a key U.S.
principle); supra notes 135–36, 138–44 and accompanying text (describing U.S. Military and
Congressional opposition to the ICOC approach).
159
See Brian Wessel, The Rule of Law in Outer Space: The Effects of Treaties and
Nonbinding Agreements on International Space Law, 35 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV.
289, 314 (2012) (“Flexibility to deal with unanticipated circumstances is an important value in
any legal system, but it is especially so in international space law. . . . Current space law
achieves this flexibility by using nonbinding instruments . . . .”).
160
Defense Hearing, supra note 136, at 15 (“Ambassador Schulte: Sir, it would not do that.
It would not—it doesn’t constrain . . . capabilities; it constrains behavior.”); Turner Brinton,
Sessions, Schulte Spar Over Proposed Space Accord, SPACE NEWS (May 13, 2011), http://
www.spacenews.com/article/sessions-schulte-spar-accord.
161
Defense Hearing, supra note 136, at 15; Brinton, supra note 160.
162
See, e.g., CARL Q. CHRISTOL, Space Debris and Military Testing, PROCEEDINGS OF THE
31ST COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 234, 234–43 (1989), reprinted in SPACE
LAW: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE, supra note 81, at 263, 274 (“Formal treaty law makes it
clear that space activities are subject to important constraints.”); Imburgia, supra note 18, at
633–34 (discussing potential enforcement mechanisms).
163
See Wessel, supra note 159, at 314–15 (discussing how nonbinding instruments allow
states to respond to developments in technology and research without breaching a legally
binding commitment and do so quicker due to fewer procedural hurdles at the domestic level).
164
Id. at 314–17.

900

GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 42:877

to all other space-faring countries.165 National governments would have little
incentive to set guidelines that would provide concessions to the
international community.166
An ICOC, however, reaches a middle ground between these two
extremes. It provides national governments the flexibility to take actions to
defend themselves from perceived threats, while establishing a clear starting
point for conduct guidelines.167 This starting point provides countries with
greater certainty of what the final agreement will entail, allowing for greater
confidence in planning national space activities.168 It also ensures that all
parties bear some constraint, such that no member country will have
complete freedom in their outer space activities.169
Second, an ICOC approach secures the United States’ ability to exert
leadership in drafting the guidelines put forth for an international agreement.
A voluntary regime of national policies would clearly provide the United
States with no direct input into the policies of each country.170 Similarly, a
165

Mirmina, supra note 91, at 656–57 (“This approach would ensure a degree of flexibility
to individual states in the authorization and supervision of space activities. States like the
United States that actively regulate private space activities will probably require more detailed
regulatory provisions . . . than states that lack domestic launch capabilities.”).
166
See, e.g., id. at 657 (“[T]he only effective enforcement mechanism when a state fails to
comply with its obligations under the regime would be public disclosure. Apart from national
reporting, however, there is no other immediately available ‘stick’ to use against a state that
promised to follow a practice but has subsequently failed to do so . . . .”); CHRISTOL, supra note
162, at 276 (“To have significance [negotiations] would have to result in an agreement in which
both parties would feel confident that their respective national interests would be protected.”).
167
See supra note 159 and accompanying text (discussing how an ICOC allows member states
needed flexibility); Mirmina, supra note 91, at 660 (“[A] voluntary code of conduct could later
evolve into a legally binding instrument.”); see also Stephen Gorove, Another Look at Arms
Control and at What May be Agreed Upon, II ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT IN OUTER
SPACE 109–18 (1987), reprinted in STEPHEN GOROVE, DEVELOPMENTS IN SPACE LAW: ISSUES
AND POLICIES 263, 272 (1991) (“Because of the vital role that satellites can play in strategic
defense and offense and in view of the almost daily scientific and technological advances in the
development of new weapons, decision makers are doubly hesitant to agree on measures that
could jeopardize or adversely affect their country’s security position.”); CHRISTOL, supra note
93, at 353 (“In the area of military reconnaissance a State may take action perceived by it to be in
its national interest in the absence of prohibitory legal prescriptions.”).
168
See Wessel, supra note 159, at 318 (“Therefore, an analysis of the place of nonbinding
agreements in the rule of law in outer space must focus on the degree to which international
space law provides enough certainty for states to plan their activities in outer space. The
current nonbinding agreements and planned codes of conduct to a large extent fulfill this goal,
at least at the current stage of space utilization.”).
169
See Krepon, supra note 16 (using the analogy of highway traffic regulations to illustrate
how some rules, even if they are broken, promote greater safety than having no rules at all).
170
Mirmina, supra note 91, at 656 (“The commitment each state assumes [in a voluntary
adherence regime] is to enforce a national supervisory/regulatory structure. Practices to

2014]

THE EMPIRE CAN STILL STRIKE BACK

901

United Nations approach to an international agreement would minimize the
role played by the United States, as the United States would have the same
level of input as all other STSC members.171 Further, creating a new
intergovernmental organization to govern an agreement presents too much
uncertainty in the role the United States would actually play since this group
does not yet exist.172 Unlike these approaches, an ICOC allows the United
States to take a strong leadership role in developing the proposed
guidelines.173 By doing so, the United States is best able to ensure its
concerns regarding national security and enforcement are represented in the
final agreement.
B. Best Short-Term Approach to Long-Term Resolution
While some may argue that a binding agreement is the best long-term
solution to tackling the issue of space debris,174 particularly if the United
States is able to use its position as a major space-faring power to establish
favorable regulations with respect to national security maneuverability, a
binding agreement is unlikely to be established anytime soon.175 General
international apathy has existed towards using formal channels to create such

mitigate the accumulation of orbital debris would therefore be implemented through domestic
regulations and policy.”).
171
See id. at 657–58 (“One advantage of pursuing UN-based guidelines is the widespread
participation of STSC members. All major space-faring nations are members of the STSC.
Any of them can take part in the drafting by the Space Debris Working Group of the STSC,
and it is hoped that the draft’s creation with the approval of the members would enhance the
likelihood of its enthusiastic adoption and implementation in their respective capitals.”);
McDermott, supra note 39, at 158 (discussing the greater likelihood for success of a non-UN
based approach such that the number of nations involved in negotiations is reduced).
172
See supra notes 110, 112–13 and accompanying text (discussing specific concerns that
exist in an approach involving the development of a new international organization made up
of individual member states).
173
See MICHAEL KREPON, SPACE: A CODE OF CONDUCT 2 (2008), available at http://www.st
imson.org/books-reports/space-a-code-of-conduct/ (“There are no more than a dozen major
space-faring nations that can launch their own satellites. If most or all of these nations could
agree on a code of conduct, they would strengthen international norms and make it less likely
that outliers will act otherwise. If the [sixty-five-nation] Conference on Disarmament
continues to be deadlocked, the United States could initiate negotiations among major spacefaring nations to establish rules of the road.”).
174
E.g., Imburgia, supra note 18 (arguing that a binding international agreement is the only
feasible solution to the threat of space debris).
175
See supra notes 93–94 and accompanying text (describing the impracticality that a
binding agreement can be reached); see also CHRISTOL, supra note 93, at 349–50 (discussing
the time frame for the creation of the five major UN agreements).
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a binding agreement for at least the past twenty years.176 However, an ICOC
approach offers a short-term resolution that moves the international
community towards a more permanent solution to the remediation of space
debris.177 An ICOC is the best approach for the United States in the shortterm, particularly regarding national security maneuverability, because: (1) it
can be accomplished quickly; (2) an ICOC approach has proven successful
for the United States military in the past; and (3) it offers achievable progress
towards a potential longer-term solution.
1. Can Be Accomplished Quickly
An ICOC has the benefit of a speedy enactment versus other international
agreement alternatives. By design, an ICOC allows for a faster approval
process. Unlike a binding agreement, United Nations agreement, or new
intergovernmental organization agreement, an ICOC is primarily drafted
before the parties are assembled at the negotiation table.178 This has the
benefit of limiting the vast amounts of negotiation to the edges of the
agreement, rather than bogging down the process with deliberations over the
essence of the agreement.179 Granted, even under this approach, in order to
increase its chances of passage, the United States would still have to consider
other national parties’ perspectives when drafting an ICOC.180 But, the
distinction with this approach is that by taking the vast amount of the drafting
process out of negotiation, the ultimate approval process is greatly sped up.181
Upon submitting its draft ICOC, the United States would be able to devote its
efforts to diplomatic persuasion rather than perpetual negotiation.

176

STEPHEN GOROVE, DEVELOPMENTS IN SPACE LAW: ISSUES AND POLICIES 170–71 (1991).
See supra note 167 and accompanying text (describing the ICOC approach as a
compromise between complete freedom for space-faring nations and an obtrusively
constrictive agreement).
178
See supra note 132 (discussing how the EU ICOC was drafted prior to outreach seeking
international support and ratification).
179
See, e.g., U.S. Congress, Orbiting Debris: A Space Environmental Problem 9 (Office of
Technology Assessment, Background Paper No. OTA-BP-ISC-72, Sept. 1990), available at
http://www.ota.fas.org/reports/9033.pdf (“[W]hen addressed in a broad multilateral context in
which states having no current capability to launch objects into space would participate, the
subject has a high potential for becoming the subject of acrimonious debate in which the
technical issues and solutions could be lost.”).
180
See, e.g., CHRISTOL, supra note 162, at 276 (“To have significance [negotiations] would
have to result in an agreement in which both parties would feel confident that their respective
interests would be protected.”).
181
See supra note 179 and accompanying text (describing how an ICOC approach
minimizes the likelihood for futile and acrimonious negotiations).
177
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In addition, the number of parties that the United States would need to
court to create a truly international agreement is relatively small. With no
more than a dozen space-faring countries,182 the United States would not
have to exert time and diplomatic energy attempting to have every country
sign onto an agreement. Indeed, if the United States could convince most of
the space-faring group to sign on, it is more likely that other countries will
fall in line,183 or at least not pose a threat to the agreement’s effectiveness.184
Further, the ICOC approach allows the United States to work around
formal governmental structures that might present roadblocks to the passage
of an agreement. For example, an ICOC does not require formal state action
to be created.185 Indeed, national space agencies or private space operators
can agree to be bound by an ICOC without having national agreement at the
international level.186 Allowing these groups to opt-in to adherence places
additional pressure on the national entity, thereby encouraging a faster
agreement and a more comprehensive group of bound parties.187
2. Has a Proven Track Record
ICOCs are not a new approach to international agreement for the United
States.188 Indeed, the United States has relied on ICOCs in the past to govern
troop movements in close proximity to Soviet Union forces,189 arms
proliferation agreements,190 and crewmember policies for the International

182

KREPON, supra note 173, at 2.
Id.
184
See McDermott, supra note 39 (discussing how a large number of nations involved in
negotiations of an ICOC can thwart its feasibility); supra note 179 and accompanying text
(discussing how acrimonious negotiations over the substance of an ICOC can thwart its
feasibility).
185
Mirmina, supra note 91, at 659.
186
Id.
187
See id. (“A code of conduct on orbital debris can be created in the absence of state action,
at the initiative of space agencies or private operators active in outer space, and can introduce
‘best practices’ against which state practice can later be measured.”).
188
See supra notes 119–24 and accompanying text (discussing prior successful ICOC use by
the U.S. military and private groups between 1972 and 2007).
189
See supra notes 120–21 and accompanying text (describing ICOC use between the U.S.
and Soviet Union governments in 1972 and 1989 concerning military movements); KREPON,
supra note 173 (“The US Army, Navy, and Air Force all abide by codes of conduct when
operating in close proximity to Russian forces. These ‘rules of the road’ were established in
executive agreements.” (citation omitted)).
190
See supra note 122 and accompanying text (discussing ICOCs concerning arms
proliferation utilized during the presidency of George W. Bush).
183
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Space Station.191 The United States can look to these earlier ICOCs and be
confident that utilizing an ICOC approach for space debris remediation can
be a successful method for achieving simultaneous national security aims.
While the use of these prior ICOCs provides the United States with
confidence in a successful implementation of future military ICOCs, it also
provides the United States with institutional knowledge to aid in that pursuit.
The negotiations that occurred surrounding prior ICOCs, as well as any
diplomatic relationships that developed, can be utilized to ensure the smooth
deployment of a future ICOC addressing space debris remediation. Further,
it is likely from these earlier efforts that the United States is well aware of
the views that each of the space-faring countries holds regarding
international space policies and national security implications. All of this
information will aid the United States in drafting an ICOC with a high
likelihood of success by helping to make certain a faster and more
comprehensive framework for agreement.
3. Will Serve as a Building Block
Prior ICOCs also provide evidence that voluntary ICOCs can serve as a
building block for longer-term or legally binding agreements.192 In
particular, the experience of the ICOC addressing crew policies abroad the
International Space Station provides a clear example of how this might
work.193 After establishing an ICOC about crew procedures among the
partner states, the parties included a provision invoking this ICOC in the
formalized foundation of the International Space Station partnership.194
Specifically, this provision requires partner states to observe the ICOC,
inferring that legal consequences might exist for violations.195
The International Space Station example illustrates the building block
effect an ICOC can have. By agreeing to voluntary compliance in the
beginning through an ICOC, the International Space Station parties were
moved closer to the formalization of a longer-term partnership that was built
upon their prior agreements.196 Early agreements created through ICOCs can
establish initial trust, shared sacrifice, and shared commitment to a common
191
See supra note 123 and accompanying text (discussing a 2005 ICOC regarding
International Space Station crewmember policies).
192
Mirmina, supra note 91, at 659.
193
Id.
194
Id.
195
Id.
196
Id.
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goal—all ingredients necessary for the success of a long-term partnership.
More importantly, for those primarily concerned with the threat posed by
space debris, an ICOC can provide immediate action, albeit more limited
than a comprehensive longer-term approach, while that longer-term approach
continues to be hammered out.
IV. CONCLUSION
A threat such as space debris that is fundamentally international in scope
requires a fundamentally international approach to resolve it. However, past
U.S. action has clearly shown a resistance to accept proposed international
resolutions that inhibit U.S. national security maneuverability. The United
States will not approve any proposal that thwarts its ability to use outer space
for national security defense. Equally important, the United States is highly
unlikely to take an approach that would minimize its role as a major spacefaring nation by preventing it to exert a proportionate amount of influence
over the drafting of guidelines that seek to control national space policies.
An ICOC presents a path of achieving the greatest impact towards space
debris remediation while maximizing national security maneuverability.
This approach offers the best path forward because it is so closely aligned
with U.S. space principles. Any ICOC would allow the United States great
flexibility to maintain hawkish military capabilities in outer space should the
need arise. Because an ICOC merely places restraint on behaviors that
generate space debris, not military capabilities, it offers a realistic solution to
the issue at hand that can survive the great scrutiny of Congressional
Republicans and DOD officials focused on national security. In addition, it
allows the United States to exert greater control at the forefront of the
drafting process. Unlike more formal alternatives that rely on consensus, an
ICOC ensures that the United States can control the negotiation over final
guidelines from the beginning.
Further, an ICOC offers a practical solution that can provide a framework
for a future longer-term solution, whether it is binding or not. Because it
does not rely on a formal deliberative body to produce the guidelines, an
ICOC approach can be achieved relatively quickly. Indeed, with U.S.
support behind the state-sponsored EU draft, the potential for an endorsed
ICOC in a relatively short period of time is greatly increased.
This approach both builds upon past U.S. success with ICOCs and offers
achievable progress towards the successful ratification of a more
comprehensive solution farther down the road. Because the U.S. military has
already employed ICOCs, particularly with respect to recent space law
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issues, it is likely to be more willing to embrace the predictability of an
ICOC approach over other more dubious solutions. In addition, the Obama
Administration can point to these successful prior uses of ICOCs to assuage
the concerns of congressional Republicans and DOD officials.
The threat of space debris to future space missions is clear as a result of
incidents like that in 2009 affecting the International Space Station. As the
international community reaches a technological maturity that allows easier
and more long-term access to space, the implications of space debris become
even greater. We must devise a solution that will actually address the
problem, reversing the annual increase of objects in space while also holding
space-faring parties responsible for cleaning up their proprietary space
debris. As a leading space power, the United States clearly has a large role
in this. However, to be ultimately successful, a proposed solution must have
a realistic chance of approval. An ICOC offers the best balance of carving
out actual progress on this issue and doing so while maintaining the United
States’ need for a high degree of national security maneuverability. As it has
done throughout its history, the United States should take a leadership role in
ensuring movement toward a true resolution by embracing an ICOC
approach to space debris and thereby providing a responsible framework for
the rest of the international community to follow.

